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Despite  its  small  size,  less  than  10%  of  New  York  City  in  area,  Hong  Kong  has  attracted 
international  attention  for  its  economic  activities.  Friedman’s  (1997)  praise  of  Hong  Kong’s 
“free market practice”  is one example.1 More  recently, as housing prices  in Hong Kong have 







In  Mr.  Leung’s  view,  the  market  is  failing  to  correctly  match  supply  of  apartments  to  the 
demand, which also  incorrectly pricing apartments that are on the market. So he proposes an 




present  some  intuitive  graphs  and  delay  more  formal  analysis  to  later  sections.  Figure  1a 
demonstrates  that  Hong  Kong  house  prices  reached  a  new  height  in  2013Q3,  even  after 
                                                            
1 Friedman  (1997)  claims  that  “…Economists and social scientists complain that we are at a disadvantage 
compared with physical and biological scientists because we cannot conduct controlled experiments. However, the 
experiments that nature throws up can be every bit as instructive as deliberately contrived experiments. Take the 
fifty-year experiment in economic policy provided by Hong Kong between the end of World War II and this past July, 
when Hong Kong reverted to China…. In this experiment, Hong Kong represents the experimental treatment; 
Britain, Israel, and the United States serve as controls. Immediately after World War II, Hong Kong had a 
population of about 600,000. A colony of Britain, it did not receive its freedom after the war as most other colonies 
did…. After the Communists took control of mainland China, a flood of refugees came to Hong Kong. Over the next 
fifty years, the population exploded. Today it is more than six million…. I take Britain as one control because 
Britain, a benevolent dictator, imposed different policies on Hong Kong from the ones it pursued at home…. 
Nonetheless, there are some statistics, and in 1960, the earliest date for which I have been able to get them, the 
average per capita income in Hong Kong was 28 percent of that in Great Britain; by 1996, it had risen to 137 
percent of that in Britain. In short, from 1960 to 1996, Hong Kong’s per capita income rose from about one-quarter 
of Britain’s to more than a third larger than Britain’s. It’s easy to state these figures. It is more difficult to realize 
their significance. Compare Britain—the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, the nineteenth-century economic 
superpower on whose empire the sun never set—with Hong Kong, a spit of land, overcrowded, with no resources 
except for a great harbor. Yet within four decades the residents of this spit of overcrowded land had achieved a level 
of income one-third higher than that enjoyed by the residents of its former mother country….I believe that the only 
plausible explanation for the different rates of growth is socialism in Britain, free enterprise and free markets in 




correcting  for  inflation.  Figure  1b  shows  that  the  house‐price‐to‐wage  ratio  has  increased 
rapidly since 2004. In comparison, the US market is much more stable.2 As the house price‐to‐
wage  ratio  is often used as a measure of affordability, Figure 1b might  suggest  that housing 
affordability  is an  issue  that needs  to be considered  in Hong Kong. Clearly,  it  is dangerous  to 
draw  any  conclusion with  one  data  plot. We will  re‐examine  the  affordability  issue  in more 
details  in  some  later  section.  It  suffices  to  say  that  based  on  our  econometric  analysis,  un‐








Law  of  Hong  Kong,  and  in  that  sense  the  supply  constraint  is  potentially  a  very  binding 
constraint.3 More  generally,  Hong  Kong,  like  many  growing  cities,  is  confronted  with  the 













2 However, the Hong Kong government is not alone. Roubini (2013) claims that “In emerging markets, bubbles are 
appearing in Hong Kong, Singapore, China…” Even Dr. Chang-Yong Rhee, IMF’s director of the Asia and Pacific 
Department, asserted in a press conference held in Hong Kong that “Some adjustments are necessary,” for the Hong 
Kong housing market (The Standard, 2014b). More discussion on this point is provided in later sections. 
3 For the description of the boundary, please refer to the Basic Law (Instrument 11): 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf 
For a discussion of supply constraint in the economics literature, see Saiz (2010), among others. 
4 It is common in economics to clarify “stylized facts.” Among others, see Ambler et al. (2004), and Jones and 
Romer (2010). 




supply  issues  in Hong Kong. As explained below,  simply developing more  land  for  residential 
and  commercial  purposes  may  not  be  sufficient  to  immediately  “cool  down”  the  property 
market. 

















Overall,  the  new  housing  supply  is  jointly  determined  by  the  government  and  developers. 
Government  plays  a  key  role  in  redevelopment  projects,  scheduling  land  sales,  and  the 
conversion of land usage. Developers can determine the date of completion and primary selling 
prices.  In  the  following  section,  we  discuss  each  party  in  turn,  and  address  the  following 
questions.7 
(1) Housing  availability:  Are  housing  units  now  under‐supplied?  Can  and  will  the 
government increase the housing supply? 
                                                            
6 See Leung and Tang (forthcoming) and Dieci and Westerhoff (2012) for details. 
7 Notice that our sequence is to discuss availability issue first, followed by affordability and volatility. The idea is 
that housing units must be somehow “insufficiently” supplied (availability issue) first. Then the market price can 
become “too high” (affordability issue) when economic agents try to purchase units from the constrained market. 
Volatility, the third issue, is also related to price, and hence placed naturally after the discussion on affordability. 
This sequence is also consistent with the tradition in microeconomics that the allocation goods is first considered, 
and then the market price is interpreted as a “mechanism” to “implement” that (constrained) optimal allocation. 
Among others, see Mas-Colell et al (1995), McKenzie (2002), for more discussion. 
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(2) Housing  affordability:  Can  and  will  the  government  and  developers  make  private 
housing “more affordable” by lowering the house price‐to‐wage ratio? 








Following  the  tradition  of  Economics  to  discuss  the  quantity  allocation  before  the  price 
determination, this section discusses the availability of housing  in Hong Kong. The availability 
and volatility issues are related to house price and hence will be discussed in later sections. As 
shown  in  Figure  2,  on  average,  each  household  has more  than  one  housing  unit  (public  or 
private).  Thus,  if  housing  units  were  evenly  distributed,  many  issues  would  be  resolved. 
Unfortunately, housing units are not evenly distributed. Some households have multiple units 
for  investment or other purposes.8 Hence,  the demand  for both public and private housing  is 
still  un‐fulfilled.  The  following  paragraphs  briefly  describe  the  institutions  and  the  current 
situation of public rental housing, subsidized housing, and private housing in Hong Kong. 
First, we focus on the public rental market. In 2012, there were 727,800 households, 30.7% of 
the total households  in Hong Kong,  living  in public rental housing [Figure 3]. To be eligible for 
public  rental  housing,  a  household’s  income  and  assets  cannot  exceed  a  certain  limit.9 A 
1999/2000  survey  by  the  Hong  Kong  Housing  Authority  collected  information  on  108,300 
applicants in that period. If the Authority commits to keep the average waiting time for general 
applicants  at  around  three  years,  it  has  to  build  at  least  36,100  units  a  year.10 For  various 
reasons,  the  Hong  Kong  government  is  unable  to  meet  this  target,  and  hence  there  is  a 
prolonged average waiting  time  for applicants  [Table 1].11 More  importantly,  this  figure does 
                                                            
8 Clearly, this points to the distribution of home ownership, or more generally, the income or wealth distribution 
issue. This is further discussed in later sections. 
9 The income and asset limits are subject to renewal regularly. For the latest information, please visit 
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/en/flat-application/income-and-asset-limits/index.html 
10 Mr. C. W. Tung, the first Chief Executive after Hong Kong was handed over to China, made such a promise. 
Among others, see Lau (2002) for more details. 
11 According to Goodstadt (2013), such delays are interpreted as beneficial by some government officials because a 
shortened waiting time could encourage even more people to join the queue, making the “excess demand” of public 








case. Although  this statement may be  true,  it  is still  important  to note  the magnitude of  the 
“supply  shortage”  in Hong Kong. For example,  in  the year 2012/2013,  the Housing Authority 
received 40,000 new applications, and the accumulated applications reached 229,000. However, 
the annual new supply of public  rental housing was only 13,114 units.  It has been estimated 
that  an  applicant  has  to wait  17  years  for  a  public  housing  unit.  This  is  consistent with  the 
conventional wisdom in economics that when a private good is provided at a subsidized rate, it 
will  be  over‐subscribed  and  will  result  in  rationing.13 Even  though  the  government’s  policy 
address  in 2013/14  stated  that  the new public housing  supply will  further  increase  to about 
20,000 units a year, the annual number of new applications is twice that of the new supply, and 
hence the average waiting time may not be shortened for at least the next few years. 
In addition  to public  rental housing,  the Hong Kong government has  tried  to promote home‐
ownership. For  instance,  the Home Ownership Scheme  (HOS) attempts  to provide  subsidized 
home ownership to families that cannot afford a private unit. Usually, the subsidized units are 
sold at about 70% of market value. If the homeowner sells the subsidized unit in the secondary 
market,  they  have  to  pay  the  “premium”14 back  to  the  government.  The  availability  of 
subsidized  housing  is  controlled  by  the  government.  In  November  2002,  the  government 
attempted to stabilize the housing market by ending the HOS. In 2011, it launched an enhanced 
program  to  subsidize  home  ownership  called  the  “My  Home  Purchase  Plan”.15 Under  the 
current housing target, the government plans to build 8,000 HOS units per year. 
In  an  economy  based  on  an  laissez  faire  philosophy,  the  private  housing  market  plays  an 




12 In 1999/2000 there were 14,601 houses allocated to this category. 
13 Among others, see Banerjee (1997), Friedman (2002), and Wong (1998) for more discussion on this point. See 
also Leung, Sarpca, and Yilmaz (2012) for a discussion of how the introduction of public housing could affect the 
rent gradient, the population composition across communities, labor supply, and social welfare. 
14 The calculation of premium is as follows: 
ܲݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉ ൌ ሺ݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݒ݈ܽݑ݁	ܽݐ	ݏ݈݈݁݅݊݃	ݐ݅݉݁ሻ ∗ ሺ௠௔௥௞௘௧	௩௔௟௨௘	௔௧	௣௨௥௖௛௔௦௜௡௚	௧௜௠௘ି௔௖௧௨௔௟	௣௨௥௖௛௔௘௜௡௚	௣௥௜௖௘ሻሺ௠௔௥௞௘௧	௩௔௟௨௘	௔௧	௣௨௥௖௛௔௦௜௡௚	௧௜௠௘ሻ  
15 In the 2012/2013 policy address, the government did not pledge to undertake any projects for the My Home 
Purchase Scheme. The land originally earmarked for the scheme was set aside for new HOS development instead. 
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the “housing  shortage”  is mainly due  to wrangles over  land use, and  it plans  to  increase  the 
supply of land, in both the short and long term, to satisfy housing and other needs.  
For  the  government  policy  to  be  effective,  an  increase  in  the  land  supply  must  lead  to  an 
increase  in  the  new  housing  supply.  Statistically,  this  statement  can  be  tested  by  running  a 
Granger causality test for the effects of an increase in the area of land sold on the new supply 
of  private  housing  units.  Clearly,  the  causality  could  run  the  other  way:  because  the 
government and  the market anticipate a high demand  for housing,  the amount of  land area 
sold by  the government  to  the private developers would  increase.  In  that case,  the causality 




Granger‐cause  the  land  sale area.17 In other words,  simply  increasing  the  land  supply, either 
through  auctions  or  tender  [Figure  5],  does  not  guarantee  that  there  will  be  more  private 
housing available in the market. This observation is further confirmed by the results reported in 
Table  2b  that  no  strong  lead‐lag  relationship  exists  between  the  two  variables  over  ±20 






number of  flats  to be constructed and  their  size  restrictions,  the developers’  still choose  the 
time in which to complete and sell the units.  
[Figures 4 and 5 and Tables 2a and 2b about here] 
The  agricultural  land policy  in Hong Kong  illustrates how developers may  influence  the new 
housing supply. To fully understand the agricultural land policy in Hong Kong, some discussion 
of  the Hong Kong  land ownership  system may be very helpful. We present a  few key points 
below, and interested readers can refer to the Appendix for further details. 
                                                            
16 In fact, Lai and Wang (1999) have done some related analysis. The results presented here can be interpreted as an 
update and extension of their research. 
17 Among others, see the Local Research Community (2013) for a related analysis. 
18 The authors are grateful for an anonymous referee’s suggestion to use Johansen’s cointegration test to study the 
long-term relationship between LSA and CNPH. However, LSA is a I(0) series and CNPH is a I(1) series. Therefore, 
this test may not be applicable in this case. 
19 For the list of developers in Hong Kong, please refer to Appendix 2. 
20 For the behavior and price strategy of developers, refer to Henderson and Thisse (1999), Gillen and Fisher (2002) 

















 The  British  takeover  was  not  warmly  welcomed,  and  misunderstandings  and  fears 
abounded.  Taxes  and  the  Sanitary  Board  were  two  important  concerns.  Some  local 
landlords  who  had  clear  vested  interests  might  have  encouraged  the  spread  of 
misunderstandings. 
 This  situation  eventually  led  to  the  disastrous  Six‐Day War.  Several  thousand  poorly 
equipped  Chinese  villagers  surrounded  and  attacked  the well‐equipped  British Army. 
Apparently, several hundred Chinese villagers were killed in that war. 
 To maintain the security of Hong Kong with  limited  forces, Sir Henry Blake, the British 
Governor of Hong Kong at that time, adopted a “Forgive and Forget” policy. Blake even 
established district councils and  invited the  leaders of the villages to  join the councils. 
Blake’s policy had a long‐term effect on Hong Kong. 
 
As a result, although  land ownership  is technically public  in Hong Kong, the government faces 




Alternatively,  developers  who  purchase  agricultural  land  from  locals  could  submit  a  similar 






In  light  of  this  process,  it  is  relatively  easy  to  understand why  although  the  contribution  of 





101.2 million square  feet  [Figure 6c].  In this period, about 25% of the abandoned agricultural 
land  was  in  the  hands  of  developers.  Clearly,  developers  are  not  interested  in  agricultural 
production. They simply wait for the “right market” and then apply for government permission 
to  convert  their  agricultural  land  to  residential  or  commercial  land.  Thus,  although  the 
government  needs  the  developers  to  purchase  land  and  develop  new  commercial  and 
residential areas,  the developers need  the government  to approve  their  land use conversion 
requests, at a “reasonable” LP so that the whole development project remains profitable. The 
relationship  between  the  government  and  the  major  developers  may  thus  be  similar  to  a 











takes  the  land  for development. However,  it has been  repeatedly  reported  that  these  rights 
have been abused  in different ways,  leading to many controversies. 24 According to the results 
of a survey conducted by Lao  (2013),  issues surrounding  the SHP are still un‐resolved. At  the 
same  time, both  the Hong Kong government and developers need  to have a  certain  level of 
                                                            
21 The study of bilateral monopolies has a long history in the economics literature. Among others, see Morgan 
(1949).  
22 Clearly, this is an application of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Among others, see Bardhan et al. (2004) and the 
reference therein for a discussion. 
23 It is well known that land use regulations can lead to severe distortions in the housing market. Among others, 
Bertaud and Malpezzi (2001) study the case of Malaysia. Leung and Teo (2011) present a multi-region, dynamic, 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to study the general equilibrium impacts of related distortions.  
24  For the official statement of the Small House Policy (SHP), see the website provided by the Hong Kong 
government, http://www.landsd.gov.hk/en/legco/house.htm. Among others, Hopkinson and Lao (2003) provide a 
comprehensive review of the issues relating to the SHP.  
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agreement  with  the  native  people  if  they  intend  to  develop  more  “agricultural  land”  for 
residential and commercial purposes. Thus, reaching an agreement with the native people may 
be an additional issue in the further development of Hong Kong. 
The second constraint comes from the  labor supply. Clearly, an  increase  in the housing supply 
implies an increase in the demand for trained and licensed construction workers. According to 
the latest consultation document of the Public Engagement Exercise on Population Policy,25 the 
number  of  job  vacancies  in  construction  sites  rose  by  74.3%  in  June  2013.  The  document 
recommends  importing workers  to complement  the existing workforce, but  it has  received a 
range of feedback. Although the Labor Advisory Board took action in April 2014 to speed up the 
importation of workers through the Supplementary Labor Scheme that covers 26 categories of 






a  crucial  issue  [Mukhija  (2004);  Tiley  and  Hil  (2010);  Wang  and  Murie  (2011);  Gurran  and 
Whitehead  (2011)].  We  follow  Malpezzi  (1999)26 to  provide  a  benchmark  for  house  prices. 




More  specifically, we use  the Hong Kong data  for  the 1980Q2‐2009Q1 period as our  starting 
sample. Moving the terminal date one quarter at a time, we then repeatedly re‐estimate both 
the recursive regression model and the rolling regression model, 27 so that the parameters and 
model‐implied  real housing prices are estimated.28 Then, by  comparing  the actual value with 
                                                            
25 For details, please refer to http://www.hkpopulation.gov.hk/public_engagement/en/doc.html 
26 Leung (2014) shows that Malpezzi’s model can be approximated as the reduced form dynamics derived from a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. For the details of the formula, see Appendix 3. 
27 According to Clark and McCracken (2009), combining recursive regression (with a sampling period that increases 
over time) with a rolling regression (with a constant sampling period), can significantly improve forecasting 
accuracy when the data generation process is (potentially) subject to a structural break. As the Hong Kong housing 
market may be subject to a “structural break” during the sampling period, we consider it appropriate to use both a 
recursive and rolling regression. 
28 Notice that since model parameters are being updated in each quarter. Thus, relative to the original model of 
Malpezzi (1999), our econometric model is more “flexible” in at least two dimensions. First, our model allows the 
house price-to-income ratio to be time-varying. Second, it allows the house price change to be increasingly (or 
decreasingly) sensitive to the change of house price-to-income ratio. Yet, in spite of these relaxations, our model’s 
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than  those  implied by  the market  fundamentals, even when we allow  the  coefficients  to be 
time‐varying. In fact, the deviations seem to be significant. There are several quarters in which 
the percentage deviations are more than 6%: 2009Q3, 2010Q3, and 2012Q3. This is consistent 
with  the  results  of  Shiller  (2007)  that  the  market  fundamentals  may  not  fully  explain  the 







weekly  earnings  (both  are  I(1)  variables,  from  Table  3a),  the  results  show  a  cointegrating 
relationship  (Table 3b). This means  that  the  long–term  ratio between  the U.S. housing prices 
and weekly earnings is constant. In the case of Hong Kong, although the variables are also I(1) 
(Table 3c), the Johansen cointegration test reports that both the Trace statistic and Max‐eigen 
statistic  do  not  exceed  the  5%  critical  values  (Table  3d).  In  other  words,  the  test  statistics 
suggest  that  there  is  no  constant  long‐term  ratio  between  the  real  housing  price  and  real 
earnings in Hong Kong. This is somewhat at odds with existing economic models, which typically 
predict the existence of a steady state or some constant  long‐term value. Thus, there may be 




prediction of house price is still persistently above the actual house price. The only conclusion one can draw is that 
the house price itself persistently grows faster than the house price-to-income ratio.   
29 Clearly, there are other measures of affordability, for example purchase affordability and repayment affordability, 
such as Gan and Hill (2009). Unfortunately, to repeat the analysis of Gan and Hill (2009) in the context of Hong 




According  to  the  cross‐country data provided by  the CIA, Hong Kong has  the  second highest 
population density  in the world [Figure 8], and the related problem of the  low affordability of 




restricted  to  people  with  low  incomes.  Figure  9b  demonstrates  that  the  annual  income  of 





Some  commentators  have  attributed  the  “unaffordability’’  of  housing  to  the  so‐called  “high 
land  price  policy”  (HLPP).31 According  to  this  explanation,  the  government  deliberately  sells 
land at a high price.  In  fact,  the proceeds  from  land  sales32 are one of  the major  sources of 
government  revenue.  In  the  fiscal  year  2012/2013,  the  LP33 shares were  15.7%  of  the  total 
government revenue, followed by profits taxes [Figure 10a]. As a result, high land prices could 
be translated into the high selling price of private units.  
Although this explanation may sound  intuitive, and  it  is popular among certain groups,  it may 
not be the complete economic explanation. There are several  issues to be addressed. First, as 
shown in Table 4, land sales do not Granger‐cause real housing prices.34 Thus, even if the Hong 
Kong government does practice a HLPP,  it  is not clear whether high  land prices are translated 
into high house prices. Second, as the Hong Kong government has limited land reserves, selling 
the  land  at  a  slow  rate  (and  hence  a  high  price) may  not  be  a  bad  policy.  The  situation  is 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
authors at the moment. In addition, this paper focuses on the dynamic issue and mainly replies on time series 
techniques, which may have a very different focus than Gan and Hill (2009), which is a cross-sectional analysis by 
nature.  Clearly, there are alternative notions of “equilibrium affordability” (or the lack of it). Among others, see 
Green and Malpezzi (2003), Malpezzi (2012), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2008), Ortalo-Magné and Prat (2014). 
30 According to Bertaud (2014), comparing with cities in Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, U.S.A., Hong Kong housing was the least affordable in the year 2013.  
31 Although the Hong Kong government has never admitted the existence of such a policy, there are clues that it has 
at least attempted to maintain land prices above a certain level. For instance, the Policy Address 2008/2009 
(Paragraph 34) explicitly states that land will never be sold below market value. 
32 For the share of land revenue under different disposal types, please refer to Appendix 4. 
33 The premiums from land transactions are credited to the Capital Works Reserve Fund. The Fund can only be used 
in land acquisition, public works programs, capital subventions, and major systems, equipment, and computerization. 
For details, please refer to the link: www.budget.gov.hk/2012/eng/pdf/cwrf-mem.pdf 







the  form of below‐market‐rate public  rental housing and  subsidized ownership.  If  real estate 






We  consider  two alternative explanations  for  the  “unaffordability” of housing  in Hong Kong. 
First, we conjecture that the developers may be responsible  for the high house price  in Hong 
Kong. We follow Glaeser and Gyourko (2008) in using the price‐to‐cost ratio as a measure of the 
profit margin of developers. We  find  that  the  annual  growth  rate of price‐to‐cost  ratio over 




stock  prices  and  housing  prices.  As  the  real  stock  prices  of  the  four  major  developers  are 
positively correlated  [Table 5], we use principal component analysis  to extract  the “common 
factor”  in  the  different  developers’  stock  prices.  Clearly,  PC1  explains most  of  the  variation 
[Table  6],  and  it  is positively  and  significantly  related  to  stock prices  [Table  7].  The Granger 
causality results in Table 8 show that PC1 is Granger‐caused by real housing prices. There is also 
a feedback effect such that PC1 Granger‐causes real housing prices. As a robustness check, the 
analysis  is  repeated  for  the  other  six  developers,  and  the  same  conclusion  is  reached.  In 




35 This is consistent with Shih’s theory of Hong Kong’s housing policy. According to Shih (2014), the British 
government did not devote many resources to the development of Hong Kong. It thus needed to establish the colony 
as a low income tax and virtually free-trade port. Hence, to finance any public expenditures, the government now 
needs to sell land at a high price. 
36 Clearly, whether the Hong Kong government is “rational” in the sense of economics is beyond the scope of this 
study. We thank some anonymous friends for this qualification.  
37 Following Leung and Tang (2012), we designate the periods for the Asian financial crisis and global financial 









fact  that  the  income  of  certain  groups  in  the  society  cannot  keep  pace with  the  aggregate 






Unfortunately,  the official data  for  the  study of  income  inequality  is  limited  in Hong Kong.39 






much of the macroeconomics literature,     1Y A K N  , where Y is the aggregate output,  A is the 
productivity,  K is  the aggregate  capital,  N is  the aggregate  labor  inputs, and  the  factor markets are 








38 Among others, see also Acemoglu (2002) and Hornstein et al. (2007) for related analyses. 
39 Among others, see Lui (2011) for a related analysis. 
40 Since the Nobel-winning work of Kydland and Prescott (1982), the aggregate production function is typically 
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas for a variety of reasons. Among others, see Cooley (1995), Davis (2009), King and 
Rebelo (1999), and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, 2007) for more discussion. 
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is  very  simple.  If  housing  supply  elasticity  is  low  when  prices  are  low,  then  most  of  the 
adjustments  in  housing  markets  would  occur  when  the  market  are  affected  by  shocks. 
Therefore, when we compare the volatility of housing prices across cities, we should consider 
the potential differences in supply elasticities.   
Unfortunately,  for  most  Asian  economies,  comparable  time  series  of  house  prices  are  not 
publicly  available.  Perhaps more  importantly, we  need  to  a  statistical  relationship  between 
supply elasticity and the volatility of the housing price among cities comparable to Hong Kong, 
so that we can determine whether the housing price volatility in Hong Kong is “too high” given 
her  supply  elasticity.  Hence,  comparing  Hong  Kong  with  another  Asian  city  would  not  be 
suitable for our purposes. We thus use the relationship that has been  identified  in major U.S. 
cities.44 Although Hong Kong  is  clearly not  an American  city,  there  are  some  similarities.  For 
example,  like many American cities, Hong Kong has high  levels of maturity and  transparency, 




American  city with  a  supply elasticity of 0.76 would be  associated with  a  volatility  is 7.90%, 
which is close to the actual house price volatility of Hong Kong.46 Figure 12 shows that if Hong 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
41 Thus, our result is also consistent with the findings of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) regarding major 
economies. 
42 For instance, see Leung, Cheung, and Tang (2013) for the decomposition of volatility in the Hong Kong housing 
market and the references therein. 
43 See Glaeser et al. (2005), Green et al. (2005), Saiz (2010), and Davidoff (2013) for discussions of supply 
elasticities and housing price movements. 
44 Clearly, there are other studies that compare Hong Kong with U.S. cities. See, for instance, Chang et al. (2013) 
for an analysis on how shocks in the U.S. affect the GDP and asset markets in Hong Kong.  
45 Among others, see Newell et al. (2004) for details. 









market. 49 Due  to  the pegged exchange rate system,  the recent nominal  interest rate  in Hong 




Buyer  Stamp Duty  (15%),  Special  Stamp Duty,50 and Double  Stamp Duty,  enforcing  a  “Hong 







This  paper  has  examined  three  aspects  of  the  Hong  Kong  housing  market:  availability, 






47 Details will be provided upon request. 
48 Historically, the Hong Kong government has attempted to stabilize housing prices. In 2002, housing was in a 
trough. The government launched nine measures aimed at providing public rental houses to those in need, reducing 
direct participation in the private housing market, and improving transparency in the market. Together with the 
Individual Travel Scheme in 2003, the housing market started to recover. In fact, similar stabilizing measures have 
also been implemented in Hong Kong. For details, please refer to the document (Chinese only): 
www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/chinese/sec/library/0304fs01c.pdf. According to Stephens (2012a and 2012b), the U.K. 
government has also attempted to identify the root causes of volatility, create a sustainable housing market, and 
protect homeowners from high volatility.  
49 See Yiu, Yu, and Jin (2013) for the identification of bubbles in the Hong Kong property market. 
50 The rates of the Special Stamp Duty are available at: http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/ssd.htm. For a formal analysis 
of how the Stamp Duty affects the housing market, see Leung, Leung, and Tsang (forthcoming), among others. 
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has  recently  been  below  20,000  units  annually,  suggesting  that  there  may  be  an  “excess 
demand.”  
As the land ownership in Hong Kong is public, it is tempting to conclude that if the government 
increases  the  land  supply,  the  housing  supply  issue  (i.e.,  availability)  will  be  solved. 
Unfortunately, our econometric  findings  suggest  that even  if  the  government  increases  land 
sales, the new housing supply may not be increased, because building more housing units and 
making  them more affordable may not be  consistent with  the profit‐maximizing objective of 
the real estate developers.  
How  then  can  the Hong Kong government  increase  the availability of housing units?  Several 
strategies have been proposed. Wong (1998, 2013) suggests that current practices, such as the 
lack  of  means  testing,  could  create  a  mismatch  between  public  housing  units  and  tenants. 
Therefore,  Wong  suggests  privatizing  the  public  housing  units  to  improve  their  market 
efficiency and even the wealth of the residents.51 Alternatively, to modify the “hold and wait” 
behavior of developers, some commentators suggest specifying  in  the  land sale documents a 











with  the  aggregate  GDP  may  also  suggest  a  widening  of  income  inequality,  which  causes 
housing  units  to  be  unaffordable  to  a  growing  proportion  of  the  population.  Although  the 






51 Based on Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Ho and Wong (2006) discuss the potentially negative side of the 
privatization of public housing in Hong Kong. 
52 It is well known that developers may wait to develop when facing stochastic prices. Among others, see Wang and 
Zhou (2006) for a formal analysis. 
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instance, a  sudden and  significant  inflow of capital can drive up  the housing demand and as 







government  intends  to  lower  housing  price  volatility,  attention  should  be  shifted  to  policy 
measures  that  can  increase  the  elasticity  of  the  supply  of  housing.  Whether  this  is  worth 
pursuing, and if so, how it can be achieved, is a question for future research.  
Obviously,  several  issues are  left unexplored  in  this  study. For  instance, given  that  small and 
medium size enterprises constitute a  large number of firms  in Hong Kong, and many of these 
entrepreneurs  use  their  personal  homes  as  collateral, 53 how  the  macroeconomy  might  be 
distorted?  what  is  the  optimal  housing  and  land  use  policy?  Furthermore,  will  the  housing 
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Table  2b  Lead  lag‐table  between  Land  Sale  Area  (LSA)  and  Completions  of  New  Private 
Housing (CNPH) 
(Sampling period: 1980Q4 – 2013Q1) 
  CNPH(‐20)  CNPH(‐16)  CNPH(‐12)  CNPH(‐8)  CNPH(‐4)  CNPH(‐3) 
LSA  ‐0.130  ‐0.055  ‐0.025  0.145  0.101  ‐0.097 
 
  CNPH(‐2)  CNPH(‐1)  CNPH  CNPH(+1)  CNPH(+2)  CNPH(+3) 
LSA  0.059  0.102  0.168  ‐0.026  ‐0.109  0.027 
 
  CNPH(+4)  CNPH(+8)  CNPH(+12)  CNPH(+16)  CNPH(+20) 








































































































Table  4 Granger  Causality between  Land  Sale Area  (LSA)  and Real Housing Price  (RHP)  (F‐
statistics) 
(Sampling period: 1980Q4 – 2013Q1) 
  LSA  does  not  granger  cause 
RHP 































  CH  HEN  NWD SHK
CH  1       
HEN  0.761***  1     
NWD  0.622***  0.841*** 1  
SHK  0.870***  0.916*** 0.768*** 1
 




  HL  HOPE  HUT  HYS  SINO  WH 
HL  1           
HOPE  0.533***  1         
HUT  0.434***  0.387***  1       
HYS  0.542***  0.624***  0.584***  1     
SINO  0.782***  0.632***  0.557***  0.625***  1   
WH  0.707***  0.629***  0.563***  0.845***  0.670***  1 
 
Key: HL = Hang Lung Properties Limited; HOPE = Hopewell Holdings Limited; HUT = Hutchison 
Whampoa  Property; HYS  = Hysan Development  Company  Limited;  SINO  =  Sino  Land; WH  = 
Wharf Holdings Limited 
 



























  PC 1‐A  PC 2‐A  PC 3‐A  PC 4‐A 
CH  0.479  ‐0.672  0.491  0.280 
HEN  0.519  0.188  ‐0.587  0.592 
NWD  0.475  0.689  0.538  ‐0.102 
SHK  0.525  ‐0.197  ‐0.354  ‐0.749 
 
Panel B: Other 6 developers 
  PC1‐B  PC2‐B  PC3‐B  PC4‐B  PC5‐B  PC6‐B 
HL  0.405  ‐0.415  0.510 ‐0.236 0.415  0.420
HOPE  0.382  ‐0.336  ‐0.533 0.622 0.262  0.037
HUT  0.348  0.775  0.301 0.361 0.238  0.032
HYS  0.427  0.243  ‐0.427 ‐0.362 ‐0.398  0.536
SINO  0.431  ‐0.231  0.380 0.244 ‐0.691  ‐0.285






  PC1‐A  does  not  granger 
cause Real Housing Price 













































Bertaud,  A.  (2014).  10th  Annual  Demographia  International  Housing  Affordability  Survey. 
Available at: www.demographia.com/dhi.pdf 
Bertaud,  A.  and  S.  Malpezzi  (2001).  Measuring  the  Costs  and  Benefits  of  Urban  Land  Use 
Regulation:  A  Simple Model with  an  Application  to Malaysia.  Journal  of Housing  Economics 
10(3), 393‐418. 
Capozza, D., P. H. Hendershott, and C. Mack  (2004). An Anatomy of Price Dynamics  in  Illiquid 
Markets: Analysis and Evidence from Local Housing Markets. Real Estate Economics, 32, 1‐32. 
Chang, K.  L., N. K. Chen  and C. K. Y.  Leung  (2013).  In  the  Shadow of  the United  States: The 
International Transmission Effect of Asset Returns. Pacific Economic Review, 18(1), 1‐40. 







Clayton,  J.  (1996).  Rational  Expectations, Market  Fundamentals  and Housing  Price Volatility. 
Real Estate Economics, 24(4), 441‐470. 























Glaeser, E.  and  J. Gyourko  (2008). Rethinking  Federal Housing Policy: How  to Make Housing 
Plentiful and Affordable. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute. 
Goodstadt,  L.  (2013).  Poverty  in  the  Midst  of  Affluence:  How  Hong  Kong  Mismanaged  its 
Prosperity. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
Granger,  C.  W.  J.  (1969).  Investigating  Causal  Relations  by  Econometric  Models  and  Cross‐
Spectral Methods. Econometrica, 37(3), 424–438. 









Hase, P.  (2008). The Six‐Day War of 1899: Hong Kong  in  the Age of  Imperialism, Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press. 
Henderson,  J. V. and  J. Thisse  (1999). On the Pricing Strategy of a Land Developer.  Journal of 
Urban Economics, 45(1), 1‐16. 
Ho,  L.  S.,  Y.  Ma  and  D.  Haurin  (2008).  Domino  Effects  Within  a  Housing  Market:  The 
Transmission of House Price Changes Across Quality Tiers.   Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 37(4), 299‐316. 
Ho,  L.  S.  and G. W. C. Wong  (2006).  Privatization Of  Public Housing: Did  It Cause  The  1998 
Recession In Hong Kong?. Contemporary Economic Policy, 24(2), 262‐273. 
Hopkinson,  L.  and  M.  M.  L.  Lao  (2003).  Rethinking  the  Small  House  Policy,  Civic  Exchange, 
http://www.civic‐exchange.org/wp 
Hornstein,  A.,  P.  Krusell  and  G.  Violante  (2007).  Technology‐Policy  Interaction  in  Frictional 
Labour‐Markets. Review of Economic Studies, 74, 1089‐1124. 







































Housing  Markets,  in  Global  Housing  Markets:  Crises,  Policies  and  Institutions,  eds.  by  A. 
Bardhan, R. Edelstein and C. Kroll. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Leung, C. K. Y., and E. C. H. Tang  (forthcoming). Speculating China Economic Growth  through 
Hong Kong? Evidence  from  the Stock Market  IPO and Real Estate Markets,  International Real 
Estate Review. 
Leung, C. K. Y. and W. L. Teo (2011). Should the Optimal Portfolio be Region‐specific? A Multi‐



















Mas‐Colell,  A.,  M.  Whinston  and  J.  Green  (1995).  Microeconomic  Theory,  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press. 
McKenzie, L. W. (2002). Classical General Equilibrium Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press.  




Newell,  G.,  K.  W.  Chau,  S.  K.  Wong,  and  K.  McKinnell  (2007).  Factors  Influencing  the 
Performance  of  Hong  Kong  Real  Estate  Companies.  Journal  of  Real  Estate  Portfolio 
Management, 13(1), 75‐ 86. 




















































































Letter  A/B  actually  is  a  kind  of  land  exchange.  These  Letters  A/B  were  first  issued  by  the 
government as an alternative to cash compensation when private  land was to be resumed  in 
the New Town Development Areas of the New Territories. It aimed at speeding up acquisition 
of  private  land  for  public  purposes  by  avoiding  lengthy  arguments  over  the  level  of 






is  urgently  required  for  public  purpose  such  as  for  road  widening,  community  buildings  or 
public housing schemes. However, a considerable amount of  land being selected  for  the new 




'Letter A' was  issued by the government when private  land was urgently required needed  for 







time  when  suitable  land  becomes  available  by  payment  of  a  premium  based  upon  the 
difference in value of the agricultural land surrendered and the building land selected. 2 sq. feet 





the date of closing  the  tender  to  the operative date of  the Letter A/B surrendered would be 
awarded with the tender site.  
 
In mid 1947  there was  an outstanding  land entitlement of between 420000  and 470000  sq. 
metres  of  building  land  in  the  form  of  'letter  B'.  Because  of  the  huge  amount  of  land  area 
accumulated  from  'Letter  A/B',  the  government  should  take  some  actions  to  speed  up  the 
clearance of  the  commitments  for  'Letter A/B'.  In 1984,  it was announced  that a number of 




Later  in  June 1997,  the government enacted  the New Territories Land Exchange Entitlements 
(Resumption) Ordinance  to provide  for  the payment of  redemption money  in  respect of  land 
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   1Y A K N  , where Y is the aggregate output,  A is the productivity,  K is the aggregate capital, 
N is the aggregate labor inputs, and the factor markets are perfectly competitive, then the ratio of the 









In microeconomics, we assume  that  the economy always achieves  full employment. And hence “GDP 
per  worker”  and  “GDP  per  capita”  are  identical.  In  reality,  the  two  are  not.  The  labor  market 
participation rate changes over time. To correct for that, we need to define  N to be the aggregate labor 





            
 
may  not  be  a  constant,  since  the  labor  market  participation  rate  p
N
N










from  January 1993  to December 2011. While  the monthly  series of housing price,  consumer 
price  index  and materials  cost  index  are  available,  the  data  of  private  housing  stock  is  only 
updated once a year. Hence, we use interpolation to turn this yearly series into monthly series. 
Also, since the data  for the relevant  instruments proposed by Saiz  (2010)  is not available, we 






The  estimates  suggest  a  relatively  inelastic  housing  supply  on  average, with  a  value  of  0.76 
(=1/1.32). In the previous literature, it is shown that areas with lower supply elasticities tend to 
have high volatility of real house prices. To calculate the volatility of Hong Kong housing prices, 
the cyclical component of  the  log of  real housing price  is used.  It  is  found  that  the  standard 
deviation of real housing price is 8.37% over the sampling period. 
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